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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Henry Roy Loman entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 
a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress and motion for reconsideration. He appeals from the district court's Judgment 
of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One Felony Count, and Order of Commitment. 
Mr. Loman asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated because law 
enforcement officers conducted a search of a coat placed inside his automobile without 
a warrant and without any valid exceptions to the warrant requirement. Specifically, his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated 
when his vehicle was searched incident to his arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 
332 (April 21, 2009) (modifying New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and holding 
that "Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent 
occupants arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the 
vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of 
the arrest.") 
Prior to the search, Mr. Loman was secured away from the vehicle and, 
therefore, it was unreasonable to believe that he had access to the vehicle. 
Additionally, Mr. Loman was arrested on a warrant for failure to appear and the vehicle 
could not have contained any evidence of the offense for which he was arrested. 
Accordingly, Mr. Loman asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that 
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the search of his car fell within an exception to the warrant requirement and the district 
court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On March 15, 2011, an Information was filed charging Mr. Loman with 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.51-53.) Shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Loman filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support 
requesting that the district court "suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a 
result of an illegal arrest and an illegal search of Mr. Loman's vehicle and coat." 
(R., pp.74-79.) Mr. Loman asserted that the search was an illegal search incident to 
arrest pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), because the search was not 
justified by officer safety and Mr. Loman was being arrested on a failure to appear 
warrant, for which no evidence of the arresting offense could be located within the 
vehicle. (R., pp.74-79.) 
At the hearing on the suppression motion, the State called Officer Arredondo. 
(Tr., p.5, Ls.10-23.) Officer Arredondo testified that he was on duty on February 8, 
2011, and that he was following a vehicle belonging to Mr. Loman. (Tr., p.7, Ls.4-17.) 
The officer recognized Mr. Loman because he had previously been in contact with 
Mr. Loman when arresting Mr. Loman's girlfriend on a methamphetamine charge. 
(Tr., p.7, Ls.18-23.) The officer learned that Mr. Loman had an "outstanding warrant," 
waited for Mr. Loman to return to his vehicle after making a stop, watched Mr. Loman 
get into the passenger seat, noticed Mr. Loman suspiciously slouched over doing 
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something near his feet, activated his overhead lights, and initiated a traffic stop. 
(Tr., p.8, L.14 - p.9, L.23.) 
Mr. Loman then exited the vehicle, asked the officer what was wrong, the officer 
perceived this as threatening, drew his service weapon, informed Mr. Loman that he 
has a warrant for his arrest, and instructed him to place his hands behind his back. (Tr., 
p.9, L.23 - p.1 0, L.4.) Mr. Loman began to take off his jacket. (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) The 
officer ordered him to leave the jacket on, but Mr. Loman removed the jacket and placed 
it inside the car, closing the door behind him. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) Officer Arredondo 
testified that Mr. Loman took off the jacket after he was told he was under arrest. 
(Tr., p.10, Ls.19-22.) After the door was shut, the officer "[p]laced Mr. Loman under 
arrest by putting him in handcuffs and retrieved the coat out of the vehicle." (Tr., p.10, 
L.25 - p.11, L.1.) He then clarified that once Mr. Loman was in custody, being under 
the control of another officer, he then retrieved the coat. (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-16.) While 
Mr. Loman was in custody, Officer Arredondo searched the coat and discovered 
methamphetamine and other paraphernalia in a pocket. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-14.) After 
searching the coat, the officer patted down the driver of the car, ran a drug dog around 
the vehicle, and after the dog alerted, preformed another search; no other narcotics 
were found. (Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14, L.21.) During cross-examination, the officer 
clarified that it was not until both the driver and Mr. Loman were secured that he 
searched the coat. (Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.21, L.18.) 
Officer Arredondo explained that he believed Mr. Loman removing the coat was 
suspicious to him because it was a very cold day and "in my training and experience, 
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when people are that persistent about getting away from something, there is either 
illegal contraband in it or weapons of some nature." (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19.) 
The State then presented argument that the search was valid incident to arrest, 
based on probable cause, and, if the district court disagreed, the contraband would 
have been inevitably discovered. (Tr., p.25, L.17 - p.28, L.24.) The district court issued 
an order on the motion after summarizing the facts. (Tr., p.33, LA - p.35, L.17.) The 
district court found the following: 
Arizona v. Gant obviously has changed the whole principle of automobile 
searches. I think it's clear that that case holds in order to search an 
automobile incident to an arrest, there has to be some observable basis 
for an officer to believe that what is in the vehicle presents a danger to the 
officer; or, there has to be some basis to believe that there is contraband 
which is the subject of the arrest of the defendant in that vehicle. 
I think Gant is distinguishable from this case for this reason. If 
Mr. Loman's jacket had been left in the vehicle and the state was 
attempting to justify the seizure of that jacket and the search of that jacket 
based upon the Gant case, I would agree that there is no basis to justify 
that. This case is different because the jacket was originally outside of the 
vehicle at the time of the arrest and ultimately retrieved from the vehicle by 
the officer because the defendant put that jacket in the vehicle. 
[after analyzing State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000)] This 
case is more clearly aligned with Bowman. The reason is, is that in my 
view, that the position of Mr. Mason as the driver of the vehicle who had 
immediate access to that jacket lying on the passenger seat, is the 
equivalent of the woman in the Bowman case having access to the coat 
when she was some several feel away from the defendant. 
It is clearly reasonable for an officer to conclude in a case like this 
that Mr. Loman's activities with regard to this jacket were suspect. I mean 
that in this context, with it's 28 degrees out and cold in the middle of 
January, the only logical conclusion that I could come to if I was in the 
officer's position would be that Mr. Loman either had something in that 
coat that was contraband or a weapon or something that he didn't want 
the officer to see. It certainly would be an objective observation of a 
reasonable suspicion to search it. 
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The reason I say again Gant does not apply as far as I'm 
concerned in this case is because the fact that this coat was not in the 
vehicle to begin with. If it had been, Mr. Hatch, I would be granting your 
motion today because I don't think it would be sustained on that basis. 
The state also argues, and I'll address this briefly just for the 
record, that there was probable cause to search the automobile based 
upon the observations that occurred here. I don't agree with that one, 
Ms. Kippes. Though I have said that it is certainly reasonable for an 
officer to conclude that there might be something wrong, that's the 
problem. The word might doesn't equate in my view to probable cause. 
Is there inevitable discovery? I don't think I really need to reach 
that issue in this case. Certainly the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. 
There's nothing wrong with that - well, it's not a search, that activity. I 
guess the argument is being made if the coat had stayed in the vehicle, 
the dog would have alerted and ultimately would have found the odor on 
the jacket, but we don't know that. That's all a lot of suspicion. So I'm not 
going to rule in this case that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies .... 
Based upon that, I'm going to deny the defendant's motion to 
suppress. I find that State vs. Bowman is controlling. Gant does not 
change that principle under the unique facts of this case. 
(Tr., p.35, L.19 - pA1, L.13.) The district court then issued an Order Denying 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. (R., p.112.) 
Ten days later, Mr. Loman filed a Motion and Memorandum for Reconsideration 
of Order Denying Motion to Suppress asserting that the unconfirmed warrant, in the 
case at hand, did not provide sufficient cause for a seizure and/or provided only 
reasonable suspicion to detain until the warrant was confirmed and, therefore, the state 
did not have sufficient cause to search the car incident to arrest. (R., pp.114-116.) A 
hearing was held on the motion. (R., p.120.) 
At the hearing, the State again presented the testimony of Officer Arredondo. 
(Tr., pA5, Ls.1-12.) Officer Arredondo testified that when he first saw Mr. Loman, he 
ran a check for warrants through IHOP and NCIC and received information that there 
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was an unconfirmed warrant for Mr. Loman. (Tr., p.45, L.19 - p.47, L.25.) When the 
officer handcuffed Mr. Loman he was only being detained, and it was not until dispatch 
confirmed the warrant that he placed Mr. Loman under arrest. (Tr., p.48, L.7 - p.49, 
L.3.) The jacket was not searched until after the confirmation that the warrant was valid. 
(Tr., p.49, Ls.4-7.) Defense counsel clarified that Mr. Loman was not under arrest when 
he placed the jacket in the car; the officer agreed and stated that Mr. Loman was only 
detained at that time. (Tr., p.50, L.2 - p.51, L.3.) 
Defense counsel then argued that when the officer had contact with Mr. Loman 
he only had, at best, justification to detain him, not to arrest. (Tr., p.54, L.22 - p.55, 
L.6.) Because the officer did not arrest Mr. Loman until the warrant was confirmed, the 
jacket had been placed in the car before the arrest and is subject to the Gant 
restrictions. (Tr., p.55, Ls.7-11.) The district court then found that: 
The issue that is being focused on here is whether or not I think the 
retrieval of the jacket from the car was valid because that occurred before 
the confirmation of the arrest warrant. I think that's what Mr. Hatch is 
focusing on, I think, if I'm hearing you correctly. I still adhere to the same 
opinion that I issued earlier that, in effect, within minutes, if not seconds of 
when this, when Mr. Loman was handcuffed, he was under arrest. I think 
that under the search incident to an arrest doctrine there was a legal basis 
for the officer to have retrieved that coat. He didn't search it at the time. 
He didn't search it until after the arrest warrant was confirmed. I grant you 
there is no case law in Idaho that I could find that supports that 
conclusion, but that's the conclusion I'm going to draw in this case. 
So I guess having reconsidered the record based upon argument 
not previously made, it is still my holding that the search in this case was 
not unlawful and I will still continue to deny the suppression motion. 
You have a better record now than you had before, Mr. Hatch. 
(Tr., p.64, L.12- p.65, L.9.) The district court then issued an Order Denying Defendant's 
Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Suppress. (R., P .121.) 
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Following the denial of his suppression motions, Mr. Loman entered a conditional 
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the 
suppression issues. (R., pp.126, 137, 139-140.) The remaining charges were 
dismissed. (R., p.147.) Ultimately, Mr. Loman was sentenced to a unified sentence of 
six years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.158-161.) Mr. Loman filed a Notice of Appeal 
timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction Upon a Plea of Guilty to One 
Felony Count, and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.166-168.) Mr. Loman also filed an 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Loman's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Loman's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
In the present case, because this was a warrantless search, the State bore the 
burden of proving that the search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. Officers searched Mr. Loman's car, specifically a coat inside, without a 
valid exception to the warrant requirement. In light of Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 
(2009), Mr. Loman asserts that his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution were violated when officers conducted a warrantless search 
of his vehicle. As such, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion in bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 
336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted; 
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely 
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001). At a suppression hearing, the 
power to asses the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts, 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 
Idaho 102, 106 (1995). The determination of whether a search is reasonable, and 
therefore complies with the Fourth Amendment, is a question of law over which the 
Appellate Court exercises free review. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400 (Ct. App. 
1998); State v. Mcintee, 124 Idaho 803, 804 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Loman's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U. S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional 
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by 
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against 
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). "[S]earches and seizures 
'conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few 
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'" Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)). The 
State "bears the burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a 
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable 
under the circumstances." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(citation omitted). If the government fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as 
a result of the illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived from the 
original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219 
(1999); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340, 347 (1987). 
1. Search Incident To Arrest 
Originally, the district court found that: 
10 
If Mr. Loman's jacket had been left in the vehicle and the state was 
attempting to justify the seizure of that jacket and the search of that jacket 
based upon the Gant case, I would agree that there is no basis to justify 
that. This case is different because the jacket was originally outside of the 
vehicle at the time of the arrest and ultimately retrieved from the vehicle by 
the officer because the defendant put that jacket in the vehicle. 
(Tr., p.36, Ls.4-12.) 
Shortly after the traffic stop was initiated, Mr. Loman exited the vehicle, asked the 
officer what was wrong, the officer informed Mr. Loman that he had a warrant for his 
arrest, and instructed him to place his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, 
L.4.) Mr. Loman began to take off his jacket. (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-7.) The officer ordered 
him to leave the jacket on, but Mr. Loman removed the jacket and placed it inside the 
car, closing the door behind him. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) After the door was shut, the 
officer "[p]laced Mr. Loman under arrest by putting him in handcuffs and retrieved the 
coat out of the vehicle." (Tr., p.1 0, L.25 - p.11, L.1.) 
Officer Arredondo testified at the initial suppression hearing that Mr. Loman took 
off the jacket after he was told he was under arrest. (Tr., p.10, Ls.19-22.) However, at 
the second hearing, he testified that when the officer handcuffed Mr. Loman he was 
only being detained and it was not until dispatch confirmed the warrant that he placed 
Mr. Loman under arrest. (Tr., p.48, L.7 - p.49, L.3.) The jacket was not searched until 
after the confirmation that the warrant was valid. (Tr., p.49, Ls.4-7.) Defense counsel 
clarified that Mr. Loman was not under arrest when he placed the jacket in the car; the 
officer agreed and stated that Mr. Loman was only detained at that time. (Tr., p.50, L.2 
- p.51, L.3.) 
As such, Mr. Loman was not arrested until after the jacket was placed in the car 
and the search of the coat, located in the car at the time of arrest, must comply with 
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Gant. The district court erred in finding, following the testimony in the second hearing, 
that: 
I still adhere to the same opinion that I issued earlier that, in effect, within 
minutes, if not seconds of when this, when Mr. Loman was handcuffed, he 
was under arrest. I think that under the search incident to an arrest 
doctrine there was a legal basis for the officer to have retrieved that coat. 
He didn't search it at the time. He didn't search it until after the arrest 
warrant was confirmed. I grant you there is no case law in Idaho that I 
could find that supports that conclusion, but that's the conclusion I'm going 
to draw in this case. 
(Tr., p.64, L.12- p.65, L.9.) 
In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the United States Supreme Court 
clarified its case law, specifically, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), delineating 
the State's burden in seeking to establish the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of 
a recent occupant: 
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a 
search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a 
warrant or show another exception to the warrant requirement applies. 
Gant, 556 U.S at 351. 
Therefore, two salient factors must be met in order to sustain a warrantless 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest - first, that the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search; and second, 
that there exists probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest exists in 
the places to be searched within the vehicle. Neither factor can be met under the facts 
of th is case. 
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a. Mr. Loman Was Neither Unsecured Nor Within Reach Of The 
Automobile At The Time Of His Arrest 
The scope of authorization to conduct a search incident to arrest is measured by 
the relationship between the arrestee and the vehicle at the time the arrest occurs, and 
such a search is generally not permissible where "the arrestee has been secured and 
cannot access the interior of the vehicle," following arrest. Gant, 556 U.S. 335; see a/so 
Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 621 (limiting application of search of a vehicle incident 
to the arrest of a recent occupant of that vehicle to cases where the arrestee is, "outside 
of, but still in control of, the vehicle" at the time of arrest). Under these circumstances, 
the State cannot meet the test of showing that Mr. Loman was within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment and unsecured at the time of the search. 
Shortly after the traffic stop was initiated, Mr. Loman exited the vehicle, asked the 
officer what was wrong, the officer perceived this as threatening, drew his service 
weapon, informed Mr. Loman that he has a warrant for his arrest, and instructed him to 
place his hands behind his back. (Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.4.) Mr. Loman removed his 
jacket and placed it inside the car, closing the door behind him. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) 
After the door was shut, the officer "[p]laced Mr. Loman under arrest by putting him in 
handcuffs and retrieved the coat out of the vehicle." (Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.1.) 
However, at the second hearing, Officer Arredondo testified that when he handcuffed 
Mr. Loman he was only being detained, and it was not until dispatch confirmed the 
warrant that he placed Mr. Loman under arrest. (Tr., p.4S, L.7 - p.49, L.3.) 
Officer Aredondo clarified that once Mr. Loman was in custody, being under the 
control of another officer, he then retrieved the coat. (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-16.) While 
Mr. Loman was in custody, Officer Arredondo searched the coat and discovered 
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methamphetamine and other paraphernalia in a pocket. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-14.) Later, the 
officer clarified that it was not until both the driver and Mr. Loman were secured that he 
searched the coat. (Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.21, L.18.) 
Mr. Loman was not a recent occupant at the time of the search because he was 
secured away from the vehicle and no longer had the ability to control the vehicle or its 
contents. Additionally, Mr. Loman was not an immediate threat to the officers as he was 
handcuffed, removed from the immediate location, and under the control of an officer. 
Further, the State did not offer any evidence that the remaining passenger was in any 
way threatening and, in fact, both the driver and Mr. Loman were secured prior to the 
search. As such, the State failed to show that Mr. Loman was within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment and unsecured at the time of the search as required to 
justify the search under Gant. 
I. The District Court Erred In Relying On State v. Bowman 
The district court in issuing its original findings relied heavily upon State v. 
Bowman, 134 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000). In Bowman, the Court of Appeals upheld the 
search of Mr. Bowman's jacket incident to arrest after he handed the jacket to a woman 
a few feet away immediately prior to his arrest. Id. The Court found that, had there 
been a weapon in the coat, all of the people involved were "within the zone of activity in 
which it could have been used by the woman or made available to the defendant." Id. at 
180. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that: 
The potential for risk of harm to the officer on these facts was high. To 
allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before his arrest 
and thereby avoid the search of said item would seriously undercut the 
purposes and policy behind the search incident to that arrest - ensuring 
the safety of officers and bystanders through the recovery of weapons 
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within the defendant's area of immediate control and preventing the loss or 
destruction of evidence of criminal activity. Faced with the possibility that 
the jacket might contain a weapon or evidence of a crime which could be 
lost or destroyed, we conclude that Wittmuss acted reasonably in 
requesting the jacket in order to search it incident to Bowman's arrest. We 
hold that such search did not violate Bowman's constitutional rights 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
Bowman offers little guidance on the issue in the case at hand. First, Bowman 
was decided prior to Gant and Mr. Loman asserts that this Court must apply the more 
recent standards articulated in Gant. Secondly, the case at hand is distinguishable for 
several reasons. Contrary to the district court's findings, the testimony was that all of 
the non-police parties involved in the case at hand were secured prior to the search. 
(Tr., p.21, Ls.15-18, p.39, Ls.15-21.) As such, there was no potential risk to officers 
from any possible weapons in the vehicle unlike the parties in Bowman. Finally, in 
Mr. Loman's case, there was no danger that any possible evidence in the coat would be 
lost or destroyed as the coat remained on the scene and was secured in the vehicle. 
b. It Was Not Reasonable To Believe That Mr. Loman's Vehicle Would 
Contain Evidence Of The Crimes For Which He Was Arrested 
Likewise, the State in this case cannot meet its burden to show that it was 
reasonable to believe that Mr. Loman's car would contain evidence of the crime for 
which Mr. Loman was being arrested, on a warrant issued for failure to appear. It is 
only where there is "an evidentiary basis" to believe that the vehicle or containers 
searched will contain evidence of the crime of arrest that an officer may search the 
vehicle for further evidence of the crime of arrest. Gant, 556 U.S. 343. In other words, 
it is the evidence specific to a case that will determine whether it is reasonable to 
believe that a vehicle, or a container therein, would have evidence of the crime of arrest, 
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rather than the fact of the arrest itself. Simply, there is no further evidence that could be 
found in Mr. Loman's car supporting his arrest for failure to appear. As such, the State 
has also failed to show that it was reasonable to believe that Mr. Loman's car would 
contain evidence of the crime for which he was arrested. 
2. Probable Cause 
The automobile exception allows police officers to conduct warrantless searches 
of automobiles if they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894 (1991). Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense 
standard; all that is required is a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating 
evidence is present. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). The officer's 
determination of probable cause must be based on objective facts which would be 
sufficient to convince a magistrate to issue a warrant under similar circumstances. 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 
124 (Ct. App. 1990). In determining whether probable cause existed, the expertise and 
experience of the officer must be taken into account. Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10 (1948); State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323 (Ct. App.1991). If probable cause 
justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of 
the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Ross, 456 U.S. 
at 825. 
In the case at hand, the district court specifically found that there was no 
probable cause to search the jacket: 
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The state also argues, and I'll address this briefly just for the record, that 
there was probable cause to search the automobile based upon the 
observations that occurred here. I don't agree with that one, Ms. Kippes. 
Though I have said that it is certainly reasonable for an officer to conclude 
that there might be something wrong, that's the problem. The word might 
doesn't equate in my view to probable cause. 
(Tr., p.40, Ls.14-21.) Mr. Loman does not challenge this finding on appeal and asserts 
that the district court determined this issue correctly. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Loman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, and 
remand his case for further proceedings. 




Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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